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not been litigated,6 had been interpreted as extending the equity juris-
diction of bankruptcy courts to matters within the scope of the doctrine
of res judicata.7 This was due to the statement that, assuming the
claimant's judgment represented a valid underlying obligation, the
bankruptcy court might subordinate the claim to those of other cre-
ditors because of the fiduciary relationship in which the claimant stood
as owner of the bankrupt one-man corporation.8 The principal case
precludes the reconsideration of the issue of fraud or collusion9 where
it has been previously litigated between the same parties on the
merits.o
CONFLICT OF LAWS
THE ACCUMULATION OF CONTACT POINTS THEORY
Defendants, An Indiana partnership, indebted to the plaintiff, doing
business in Illinois, agreed to make a cash payment and settle the
balance of an open account with a note payable in periodic installments.
6. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 302 (1939). The opinion also
stated that the trustee could collaterally attack a judgment on
grounds of fraud or collusion only in the absence of a valid plea
of res judicata. Id. at 306.
7. In re Noble, 42 F. Supp. 684 (Colo. 1941), reversed in Beneficial
Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F. (2d) 425 (C.C.A. 10th, 1942). See Mr.
Justice Rutledge, concurring in the principal case at 860; 3
Collier, Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) p. 1800. Contra: In re Redwine,
53 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ala. 1944).
8. The court reasoned that since the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 840
§ 57 k. (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 93 k. (1943) provided that "Claims
which have been allowed may be reconsidered for cause and re-
allowed or rejected in whole or in part, according to the equities
of the case . . . " that such disallowance or subordination in the
light of equitable considerations may be made originally.
9. Following an understandable tendency of courts of equity juris-
diction charged with the duty of marshalling the assets of a debtor
and distributing them equitably among his bona fide creditors;
cf. In re Mallory, 16 Med. Cas. 549, No. 8,991 (Nev. 1871).
10. "But we are aware of no principle of law or equity which sanc-
tions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle
of res judicata, which is founded upon the generally recognized
public policy that there must be some end to litigation and that
when one appears in court to present his case, is fully heard,
and the contested issue is decided against him, he may not later
renew the litigation in another court." Principal case at p. 856.
Compare the language of the District Court of Massachusetts
in Ex parte O'Nield, 18 Fed. Cas. 714, 715, No. 10,527 (Mass.
1867) in refusing to reduce a judgment claim based on damages
challenged as excessive, "Where the court rendering judgment has
jurisdiction, and there has been no fraud and no preference, no
one can examine into the consideration of a judgment, and show
by evidence, outside of the record, that the judgment ought not
to have been rendered, or not for so large a sum."
The similar English view is asserted In re Howell, 84 L.J.
1399, 1400 (&B. 1915). "The working rule is that the Registrar
can go behind a judgment, where it is a judgment by default or
compromise. He ought not to go behind it, when the judgment
has been given in open court against a person who is represented."
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The plaintiff forwarded, from Illinois, a note for signature containing
a cognovit which gave no indication of the place of signing. The de-
fendants signed the note in Indiana and mailed it to the plaintiff in
Illinois. The plaintiff then credited the account of the defendants as
satisfied. Plaintiff obtained judgement upon the note in Illinois pur-
suant to the cognovit provision, the final instalment of the principal
being overdue, and sought to enforce the Illinois judgement in Indiana.
Held: Judgement denying recovery reversed. The instrument is to be
governed by Illinois law, under which the judgment was valid; accord-
ingly it must be given full faith and credit in Indiana. W. H. Barber
Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E. (2d) 418 (Ind. 1945).
The public policy of Indiana concerning the execution or enforce-
ment of a cognovit or warrant of attorney is expressed by statute ren-
dering such cognovit void,1 prohibiting local enforcement of a foreign
judgement obtained pursuant to a cognovit provision,2 and providing a
penalty for the violation thereof.8 The principal case raises the issue
of the force and effect of the statute under the full faith and credit
clause of the U.S. Constitution,4 which requires the enforcement by a
sister state of a valid judgment,5 even though contrary to local public
policy.6 Such prior judgement, however, is subject to collateral attack
by showing a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or of the
person s in the foreign forum.
The principal case involves the validity of the personal jurisdiction
of the Illinois court over the defendants, and, if valid, must rest upon
the cognovit serving as a waiver of service of process.9 The court
classified the problem as one of contract,10 although reference was made
1. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 2-2904; Farrabaugh and Arnold,
"Commentaries on the Cognovit Note Act" (1929) 5 Ind. L. J. 93.
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 2-2905.
3. Id. § 2-2906.
4. U.S. Const. Art IV, § 1, "Full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state."
5. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290 (U.S. 1866); Roche v. McDonald,
275 U.S. 449 (1928).
6. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), 150 A.L.R.
413 (1944); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Rodenbeck v.
Crews State Bank & Trust Co., 97 Ind. App. 21, 163 N.E. 616 (1933);
3 Freeman, "Judgments" (5th ed. 1925) 2887.
7. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873); Restatement,
"Judgements" (1942) § 10.
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
9. See Note (1906) 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 449; Restatement, "Conflict of
Laws" (1934) § 81, comment b; Note (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1275.
10. The diversity of decision found in such cognovit provision cases is
due largely to incomplete analysis of the problem involved. Thefirst and major problem is that of "classification", i.e., into what
broad catagory of substantive law the factual elements fall, e.g., con-
tract, agency, corporations etc. The court is then faced with the sec-
ondary problem of "qualification", i.e., the "choice of law" appropri-
ate to the facts, e.g., in a factual situation classified as contract,
shall the law of the place of contracting, law of place of performance
apply. The diversity of decision results from non-uniformity in the
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to the principles of agency" and procedure.12 The court then considered
(1) the law of the place of execution,23 (2) the law of the place of
performance, 14 (3) the law of the place as governed by the intent of
the parties 15 and (4) the method used in modern case books on conflict
of laws's designated as "accumulation of contact points".T The court,
approach to the problem. It has been suggested by some writers
that the problem be solved at the first level of analysis, e.g., in
the principal case by classifying as a problem in agency and
applying the law of the place of the creation of the agency, where
the act of consent occurred. Gavit, "Indiana Cognovit Note Statute"(1929) 5 Ind. L. J. 208; Notes (1924) 19 Ill. L. Rev. 584, (1924)
38 Harv. L. Rev. 110, (1924) 23 Mich. L. Rev. 908; see Milliken v.
Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241 (1878). The majority of
courts, however, have "classified" the problem as one of contract.
A diversity then arises in the "qualification" of the problem. One
solution is the application of the law of the place of contracting
to determine the validity of the contract. Monarch Refrigerating
Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 155 So. 74 (1934); Garrigue v. Kellar,
164 Ind. 676, 74 N.E. 523 (1905), 69 L.R.A. 870 (1906); Acme Food
Co. v. Kirsch, 166 Mich. 433, 131 N.W. 1123 (1911), 38 L.R.A. (N.S.)
814 (1912). Other courts have "qualified" the problem as one re-
lating to performance and governed by the law of the place of per-
formance. Egley v. T.B. Bennett & Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830(1925), 40 A.L.R. 436 (1926); cf. Irose v. Balla, 181 Ind. 491, 104
N.E. 851 (1914). Still other courts have used the place of per-
formance as the place intended by the parties. Vennum v. Mertens,
119 Mo. App. 461, 95 S.W. 292 (1906). A few states have considered
the cognovit in terms of "procedure" of the forum where judgment
has been rendered. Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633
(1932), 89 A.L.R. 1495 (1934); Wedding v. First Nat. Bank, 280
Ky. 610, 133 S.W. (2d) 931 (1939); Gotham Credit Corp. v. Powell
and Sokalski, 22 N.J. Misc. 301, 38 A. (2d) 700 (1944); Hastings
v. °Bushong, 252 S.W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). New York has
apparently added consideration of the domicil of the obligor. Bald-
win Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Klein, 136 N.Y. Misc. 752, 240 N.Y.
Supp. 804 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 230 App. Div. 827, 244 N.Y. Supp.
899 (1939). See also 2 Beale, "Treatise on Conflict of Laws" (1935)
1077 et seq. The Restatement offers assistance only in the choice
of law governing the factual elements after the preliminary prob-
lem of "classification" has been solved by the law of the forum.
Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) § 7.
11. Classified as an agency situation the cognovit would serve to act
as an appointment of an agent to do the act of confessing judg-
ment. See n. 10 supra.
12. Classified as a procedural matter the cognovit merely indicates
the method of obtaining judgment in Illinois and is governed by
the law of the place of suit. See n. 10 su] ra; Ailes, "Substance
and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws" (1941) 39 Mich. L. Rev.
392; compare Cook, "Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws"
(1942) c. 6.
13. The contract was executed in Illinois since the last act in the
formation of the contract was the giving of value, the cancellation
of the open account owed by the defendants. Principal case at p.
423. Compare Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) H 313, 314.
14. The place of performance indicated by the note was Illinois.
15. Intent to be governed by Illinois law was found by jury. Principal
case at p. 419.
16. Harper and Tainter, "Cases on Conflict of Laws" (1937) 173;
Cheatham, Dowling, Goodrich, Griswold, "Cases on Conflict of Laws"(2d ed. 1941) 510.
17. Harper and Tainter, loc. cit. supra n. 16.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
in the principal case and in a subsequent case,18 established the so called
contact point rule as the 'choice of law' governing such instruments in
IndiansL1
Contrasting the contact point and the intent theory20 as a basis
of determining the validity of contracts has been the subject of much
controversial writing.21 The following basic objections to the intent
theory have been made: (1) where the intent has been specifically
expressed the parties are permitted to choose the applicable law in order
to avoid the consequences of the law normally applied, 22 (2) where the
intent has not been specifically expressed, the difficulty of ascertaining
the parties intent results in speculation by the court causing unpre-
dictability and diversity of judicial opinion.2S -Consideration of the cases
where the parties specifically provide for the application of the law
of a particular state is without the scope of this note, as is the con-
sideration of the rule of presumed intent frequently applied in usury
cases.
2
'
18. In Spahr v. P. & H. Supply Co., 63 N.E. (2d) 425 (Ind. 1945)
delivered the same day as the principal case, the court rejected
the application of the law of the place of performance and applied
the accumulation of contact points theory, referring to the principal
case as controlling.
19. Two prior conflicting Indiana decisions which may only be recon-
ciled through the application of the accumulation of contact points
theory are referred to but not overruled in the principal case. The
first, applying the rule of the place of execution, was merely dis-
tinguished in the principal case. The court indicated that in this
case there was a mis-application of the rule in finding the situs
of the place of execution. Garrigue v. Kellar, 164 Ind. 676, 74 N.E.
523 (1905), 69 L.R.A. 870 (1906); compare Ohio v. Eubank, 295
Mich. 230, 294 N.W. 166 (1940); Palmer Nat. Bank v. Van Doren,
260 Mich. 310, 244 N.W. 485 (1932). The second prior Indiana case
applied the rule of the place of performance. Egley v. T.B. Bennett
& Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1925), 40 A.L.R. 436 (1926).
20. One definition of the intent theory has been expressed, "If the
intent of the parties is expressed, or an actual intent found, either
that the Minnesota law (i.e. law of forum), or the Montana law
govern, such intent must be given effect. If the intent is not
expressed, or an actual intent found, the court must find the pre-
sumed intent and such presumed intent then fixes the law." Green
v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 35, 150 N.W. 229, 231
(1914).
21. Beale, "What Law Governs Validity of a Contract" (1909) 23 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 79, 194, 260; Lorenzen, "Validity and Effect of Con-
tracts" (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 655; Goodrich, "Handbook of Conflict
of Laws" (2d ed. 1938) 278, 279; Cook, "Logical and Legal Bases
of Conflict of Laws" (1942) c. 15; compare Westlake, "Private
International Law" (5th ed. 1912) 302; Cheshire, "Private Inter-
national Law' (1935) 182, 183.
22. See 2 Beale, loc. cit. supra n. 10; cf. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255
N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
23. See 2 Beale, op. cit. supra n. 10, at 1083.
24. 6 Williston and Thompson, "Williston on Contracts" (Rev. ed.
1938) 5097. "The usury cases have developed their own special
rule whereby in the absence of circumstances indicating a contrary
intent, the parties are presumed to have chosen the law which
will uphold the legality of the bargain." See Note (1940) 125
A.L.R. 482.
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The traditional objections to the determination of the parties intent
is satisfactorily answered by the application of the accumulation of
contact points method. The principal case defines the procedure as,
"The court will consider all acts of the parties touching the transaction
in relation to the several states involved and will apply as the law
governing the transaction the law of that state with which the facts
are in most intimate contact." 25 Many courts have employed similar
analysis in determining the applicable choice of law, i.e., the law of
the place of performance, law of place of execution etc. But it is
believed that this method has not been heretofore formulated by any
court into a rule for conflict of laws application.26
The accumulation of contact points method permits the application
of the law appropriate to the factual elements of the case rather than
the application of 'mechanical jurisprudence' such as the place of con-
tract or place of performance, 2T furthermore it parallels more closely
the results which the business man would normally anticipate when
contracting. Utilization of this method will also result in greater uni-
formity of future decisions with resulting certainty in predictability of
judicial action. It is believed, therefore, that the accumulation of con-
tact points method of determining the validity or illegality of a con-
tractual situation is therefore preferable to that advanced by the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws and utilized by many courts. 28
25. Principal case at p. 423.
26. Indicating the "modus operandi", see Seeman v. Philadelphia Ware-
house Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927); Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245
U.S. 412 (1918); Coghlan v. South C. R.R., 142 U.S. 101 (1891);
Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116 (1891); Prichard v. Norton, 106 U.S.
124 (1882); Hubbard v. Exchange Bank, 72 Fed. 234 (C.C.A. 2d,
1896), cert. denied, 163 U.S. 690 (1896) ; Coxe v. Coxe, 21 Del. Ch.
30, 180 Atl. 612 (1935); Greenlee v. Hardin, 157 Miss. 229, 127 So.
777 (1930), 71 A.L.R. 741 (1931); Cameron v. Ellis Constr. Co.,
252 N.Y. 394, 169 N.E. 622 (1930); Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co.,
150 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959, 55 Am. St. 680 (1896); In re Missouri
Steamship, 42 Ch. Div. 321 (1888). In the principal case the contact
points indicating an Illinois contract were: (a) business transacted
in Illinois, (b) debt arose in Illinois, (c) place of conference con-
cerning settlement of debt in Illinois, (d) note on Illinois form,
(e) note prepared in Illinois, and (f) lower court found parties
intended to be governed by Illinois law. The Indiana contacts
were found to be: (a) residence of debtors, and (b) note signed
and mailed in Indiana.
27. "Every attempt to reduce the law in a given field to a rule which
can be applied automatically to really new situations by process
of deductive logic is of necessity doomed to failure. In the words
of Mr. Justice Holmes, 'But certainty generally is illusion, and
repose is not the destiny of man.' " Cook, "The Present Status of
the 'Lack of Mutuality Rule' " (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 897, 912.
28. The basic objections to the application of pat rules of law such
as the law of the place of performance, etc. may be summarized
as follows: (1) In using the place of contracting to determine the
validity of an agreement it is necessary to assume a valid con-
tract in order to determine the locus of the last act in order to
determine the applicable law. Question begging technique. (2) The
courts are not consistant in ascertaining the final act. Compare
Garrigue v. Kellar, 164 Ind. 676, 74 N.E. 523 (1905), 69 L.R.A. 870
(1906) with Ohio v. Eubank, 295 Mich. 230, 294 N.W. 166 (1940);
[Vol. 22
